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COUNCIL:
OPEN LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN"

"The Council's ineffectiveness [is] attributableto the fact that the
present structure[does not] reflect the current composition of the
internationalcommunity, nor the present distributionofpower between
nations ....There must be limits on the right to veto."
- Bernd Niehaus'
Dear Mr. Secretary-General:
We begin by commending your leadership and strength as SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. Under your guidance, the United
Nations remains an indispensable organization, the work of which will
one day allow the world to realize a lasting peace. Your own work is a
testament to the fundamental U.N. principles of ensuring sovereign
equality for all members of the U.N. General Assembly, and
guaranteeing the maintenance of international peace and security. Your
commitment to these principles reflect the U.N. slogan, "[a]ll human
rights for all," 2 and your continuing dedication to equality, democracy,
and national integrity will be your legacy to the global community.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

It is in the spirit of equality, democracy, and national integrity that
we write you to begin a more effective public discussion regarding the
expansion and reform of the U.N. Security Council. Although the
subject of U.N. Security Council reform is not one typically addressed
by the Secretary-General, 3 your position does not prohibit you from

* This letter is from Craig Hammer, a student in the University of Florida Levin College
of Law International Organizations Course. Craig Hammer also wishes to acknowledge Marco
Kirby, Na Oyoo Quartey, and Shireen Hormozdi for their research assistance.
. 1. Ambassador Bernd Niehaus, Representative from Costa Rica, Assembly Continues
Considerationof Security Council Reform: Discusses Permanent and Non-Permanent Council
Membership and Use of Veto, (Nov. 17, 2000), 56th Sess., 66th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/9826,
availableat http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001117.ga9826.doc.html (last
visited Dec. 26, 2002).
2. This slogan was the theme for the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1998. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A Magna Carta for All
Humanity, availableathttp://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htin (last visited Dec. 21, 2002).
3. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Speaks of Security Council Reform in
Lecture at Foreign Ministry of Mexico (Mar. 4, 1996) U.N. Doc. SG/SM15906, availableathttp:I
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emphasizing the importance of such reform and urging the U.N.
General Assembly to adopt an effectual reformation scheme.' In 1996,
your predecessor, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali admitted
that U.N. Security Council reform was "a subject that a SecretaryGeneral was not supposed to address." However his conviction that
"Security Council reform [was and] is a critical issue... [that] must be
dealt with" compelled him to address it, despite it being taboo for him
to do so.5 He punctuated the importance of such reform when he further
asserted that "[Security Council reform] can be at the heart of a United
Nations transformed into a truly effective system for the maintenance of
international peace and security, now and in the future."6
Boutros-Ghali's statement was more than a passionate sentiment.
Rather, it pinpointed an internationally recognized problem and
effectively authorized the position of the Secretary-General to be one
which must guide the examination process surrounding the ultimate
adoption of a reformation package. Inherent in the position of
Secretary-General is the duty to act so that such reform will come to
fruition.7
You will recall that in 1993, the Open-Ended Working Group on the
Question of the Equitable Representation on and Increase in the

www.un.org/NewsfPress/docs/1996/19960304.sgsm5906.html
[hereinafter Boutros-Ghali Press Release].

(last visited Dec. 26, 2002)

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. Article 23 of the U.N. Charter identifies the permanent five members of the U.N. Security
Council (P-Five), which are the United States, China, France, United Kingdom, and Russia. U.N.
Charter art. 23. Article 23 empowers the U.N. General Assembly to elect non-permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council. Id. The rules for voting to which the U.N. Security Council must
adhere are articulated in Article 27 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 27. Both Articles 23
and 27 were amended by acts of the U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1963, and came into
force on August 31, 1965. Boutros-Ghali Press Release, supra note 3. The amendment to Article
23 enlarged the U.N. Security Council's membership from eleven to fifteen states and the
amendment to Article 27 raised the number of affirmative votes needed for a decision to pass from
seven to nine votes, not including the concurring votes of the P-Five. Id. Accordingly, BoutrosGhali asserted that by amending these Articles, the U.N. General Assembly set a precedent under
which it can amend the U.N. Charter "to fit changing circumstances and new needs." Id.This
means that the Secretary-General can respond to the existing international outcry for U.N. Security
Council reformation and encourage the affected or more outspoken member states to propose a
viable U.N. Charter amendment. To pass muster, a proposed U.N. General Assembly resolution
with U.N. Charter amendment implications requires atwo-thirds majority vote of the U.N. General
Assembly according to Article 108 of the U.N. Charter. Sir, as Secretary-General, you may guide
this process by advocating reform. See U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/4
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Membership of the Security Council (Working Group) 8 was established
to consider all aspects concerning the restructuring of the U.N. Security
Council's membership. Additionally, three years after you began your
tenure as Secretary-General came the adoption of the U.N. Millennium
Declaration,9 in which heads of state and government resolved to
intensify their efforts to achieve "a comprehensive Security Council
reform in all its aspects."'" Even though the Working Group previously
recommended that the U.N. General Assembly's consideration of U.N.
Security Council reform be continued at the U.N. General Assembly's
(current) fifty-seventh session, we, as concerned students, have noticed
that little progress has been made in the current agenda.
The problem to which Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali referred in
his statement has been repeatedly articulated by a host of U.N. General
Assembly members:" the composition of the U.N. Security Council still
does not conform to the fundamental principles and methods needed to
maintain international peace and security as required by the U.N.
Charter.' 2 Specifically, Boutros-Ghali declared that "there is widespread
agreement among Member States that the Council's present
membership and composition do not reflect the realities of economic
and political change, and are unrepresentative of the membership at
large."' 3 His belief echoed the concerns held by various member states,
which harmonize on the issue of U.N. Security Council reform. They
believe the U.N. Security Council to be a fragmented, unrepresentative

8. See Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable
Representation on an Increase in the Membership ofthe Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Supp. No. 47, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/48/47 (1994).
9. See supra note 2.
10. Id.

11. Among the more outspoken, concerned countries are Germany, Italy, Japan, Kenya,
Brazil, Ukraine, Austria, Malaysia, Poland, Mexico, Andorra, Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, Egypt,
and Senegal. See Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Hears of Frustration at Lack
of Progress in Three-Year Effort Towards Reform of Security Council (Oct. 20, 1996), U.N. Dec.
GA/9145, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19961029.ga9145.html (last
visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Frustration Press Release].

12. Currently, the U.N. Security Council is made up of 15 members; 5 permanent members
with an individual veto power and 10 non-permanent members who are elected by the U.N. General
Assembly for 2-year terms with no individual veto power. Michel J. Kelly, UN. Security Council
PermanentMembership: A New Proposalfora Twenty-First CenturyCouncil, 31 SETON HALL L.
REV. 319, 328 (2000).
13. Boutros-Ghali Press Release, supra note 3.
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body that will increasingly damage international relations absent a
workable reformation initiative. 4
By the terms of the draft decision of the U.N. Millenium
Declaration, the U.N. General Assembly would welcome amendments
to the structure of the U.N. Security Council. Widespread provisional
agreements to bring about U.N. Security Council reform have been
recorded on several occasions and various proposals have been made to
the Working Group regarding substantive reform. 5 However, in nearly
ten years, the Working Group has been unable to reach a consensus on a
substantial reform package and the need for a meaningful reform of the
U.N. Security Council persists. We believe that U.N. Security Council
reform should remain a priority in the U.N. Assembly's agenda.
Despite the support manifested by the U.N. General Assembly to
reform the U.N. Security Council throughout the forty-eighth through
the fifty-sixth sessions, we have reviewed the agenda of the fiftyseventh session and found that U.N. Security Council reform has
seemingly been pushed to the wayside. We can only assume that the
reasons for the U.N. General Assembly's redirected attention are that
the U.N. Assembly's role in seeking a peaceful solution to the enmity
between the West and the Middle-East, and its ongoing effort to combat
global terrorism have taken precedence. The U.N. Security Council's
reaction to the terrorist attacks suffered by the United States in 2001
was immediate and resolute, and we were gratified to observe a united
U.N. Security Council combat a horrific threat to international peace
and security. However, in the wake of these terrorist attacks, it was
clear that such threats to international peace and security had to be
addressed by an accurate representation of the global community. The
international dialogue regarding the attacks were controlled by the evervocal elite. We feel that this injured the legitimacy of the U.N. Security
Council, because the U.N. General Assembly has conferred the vital
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security for all

14. Cf Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More Representative Body
of the Entire UN. Membership, 12 PACE INT'L L. REv. 319, 321 (2002).
15. See Frustration Press Release, supra note 1I (for examples of the various proposals); see,
e.g., Press Release, General Assembly Opens Debate on Security Council Reform, Including
Increase in Membership and Equitable Representation, (Nov. 19, 1998) U.N. Doc.'GA/9508,
available athttp://www.un.org/News/Presstdocs/l 998/1998111 9.ga9508.html (last visited Dec. 26,

2002) [hereinafter Debate Press Release].
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not just some - of its members on the U.N. Security Council. 6 In order
for the U.N. Security Council to achieve such unquestionable
legitimacy, it must reflect the political landscape that currently exists in
the global community.
The composition of the U.N. Security Council is perhaps the most
highly criticized aspect of the United Nations because while all 191
member states are essentially the "owners" of the United Nations, the
idiosyncratic attitudes had by the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council (P-Five) toward the world body often leave a great
deal to be desired in terms of their representative capacity."7 Frequently,
the P-Five have put their short-term national self-interests before their
international obligations under the U.N. Charter."8 Additionally, their
veto power, which effectively makes the P-Five the authoritative voice
of the U.N. General Assembly, gives them unfettered discretion to
continually perpetrate this counterproductive form of prioritizing. 9
Under the U.N.s' current membership scheme, we believe that the
probability that the P-Five's official actions will spontaneously begin to
consistently protect universal - not individual - interests is low. We
also feel that to combat this imbalance of international power, the
global community must be better educated and activated to seek real
solutions to this problem if the United Nations is to grow in strength
and capacity in the coming decades.
Hence, we believe, as do many other members of the global
community, that the mechanisms of the U.N. Security Council are in
need of overhaul. The structure and purpose of the U.N. Security
Council has been deliberated over for several years and little real
16. Article 24 of the U.N. Charter states that, "[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective
action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
17. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 14.
18. Richard Butler, United Nations: Security Council Isn't Performing, INT. HERALD
TRIBUNE, Aug. 5, 1999.
19. To illustrate this point, if a crisis which threatens international peace and security arises,
and one or more members of the P-Five vetoes a sound U.N. General Assembly proposal that
combats and rectifies that crisis, then the remainder of the U.N. Security Council and practically
the whole of the U.N. General Assembly are rendered powerless. This abuse of veto power has

generated marked international frustration, and prevented the United Nations from resolving many
disputes in which millions of people suffered and died because of the absence of international
intervention that should have been spearheaded by the U.N. Security Council. Consequently, the

numbers of domestic and international conflicts have increased because proposals regarding
humanitarian intervention and military enforcement measures are often vetoed by some member
or members of the P-Five for self-interested reasons.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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progress has been made to achieve a truly representative, democratic

U.N. Security Council.20 As a vital body for the promotion of
international peace and security, the U.N. Security Council's raisons

d'6tre of conflict avoidance and resolution, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, and its steadfast protection of all human rights are in
danger of being increasingly sidelined because the U.N. Security
Council's current membership structure is less genuinely representative

of the Twenty-First Century's political, social, and economic realities
than it should be.
II. THE SOLUTION: FORMULATING A SCHEME TO REFORM THE
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
Several models to reform the U.N. Security Council exist, which
restructure the composition of the P-Five, their veto rights, and the
makeup of the non-permanent member structure.2 ' Many of these
models further allow the U.N. Security Council's mandate to develop
U.N. Security Council policies toward such issues as humanitarian
intervention and the right of intervention within a member state if
internal conflict causes - or threatens to cause - a threat to
international peace and security. We ask that the consideration of these
models by the Working Group be made a high priority on the U.N.
General Assembly's agenda, either during the current session or during
the fifty-ninth session. The U.N. Security Council must resume its
proper place at the very core of international security policy-making
and implementation. To do so effectively, U.N. Security Council
reformation is requisite.
Sir, to better facilitate your ability to act on our request that you
guide the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a viable U.N. Security
Council reformation scheme, we have scrutinized reformation schemes
proposed by a series of the most outspoken member states of the U.N.

20. The United Nations has expanded its membership from just 50 states at San Francisco
in 1945 to 191 today. Carolyn L. Willson, Current Development: Changing the Charter: The
UnitedNations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, 90 A.J.I.L. 115 (1996). It is striking that the
membership of the U.N. Security Council has not recently been evaluated because it remains

unrepresentative of U.N. membership.
21. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 12 (for U.N. Security Council reform proposals); see also
Global Policy Security Council Documents, available at http://www.globalpolicy.orglsecurityl

docs/index.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2002).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/4
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General Assembly,22 including those from Norway,23 Germany, Italy, l
Kenya,26 Austria,2 Brazil, 28 Malaysia, 29 Poland,3" Mexico,3 Andorra,32

22. Press Release, Norway Proposes Five New Permanent Seats on Security Council as
General Assembly Continues Debate on Reform Issues (Oct. 30, 1996) U.N. Doc. GA/9146,
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19961030.ga9l46.html (last visited Dec. 26,
2002) [hereinafter Norway Press Release].
23. Speaking for all Nordic countries in 1996, the representative of Norway proposed
that five new permanent seats should be created and composed of a state from Africa, one
from Asia, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean must be among the new
permanent members in order to reflect political and economic realities. id.
24. In 1996, Tono Eitel, the German representative, offered no concrete numerical figures
to specify the nature of member state representation among the U.N. Security Council. Rather, he
proposed that serious political negotiations be engaged in determining the number of member states
that would comprise the U.N. Security Council. Germany has garnered much international support
from other member states, especially Italy, which proposed that the U.N. General Assembly create
a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council for Germany and Japan. Id.
25. In 1996, Francesco Paolo Fulci's Italian proposal emerged as a main option for guiding
the reform of the U.N. Security Council, and we attempt to emulate it to a degree. In this proposal,
Fulci suggested that the U.N. General Assembly adopt ten new non-permanent seats which would
rotate among 30 member states that would be elected by the U.N. General Assembly for two-year
terms. The selection of the pool of 30 non-permanent member states would be based on unspecified
objective criteria that would be determined by the U.N. General Assembly. Id.
26. In 1996, the representative from Kenya proposed that Africa be granted two permanent
seats on the U.N. Security Council. Additionally, he proposed that not less than twenty-five nonpermanent seats would be required to ensure "equitable geographic representation on the Council."
Id.
27. In 1996, Ernst Sucharipa, the representative from Austria, proposed that only a small
enlargement of the U.N. Security Council was necessary to safeguard democratic elements and
ensure equitable representation. The official Austrian proposal suggested that the U.N. Security
Council should have no more than 25 members. Norway Press Release, supra note 22.
28. In 1996, Celso Amorim, the representative from Brazil, proposed that the U.N. Security
Council be enlarged to allow for greater participation by those countries that are capable and
willing to bear the responsibilities. Id.
29. In 1996, Bin Agam Hasmy, the representative from Malaysia, proposed that both
permanent and non-permanent U.N. Security Council membership be increased because of the
"increasingly important role of regionalism in inter-state relations." Specifically, Hasmy proposed
that eight additional permanent seats be added as well as an increase in non-permanent members
for a total of twenty-seven members on the U.N. Security Council. Id.
30. In 1996, Zbigniew Wlosowicz, the representative from Poland, was less disposed to a
significant increase in the number of member states on the U.N. Security Council. Poland's official
position was that the ideal size of the U.N. Security Council lay "probably between twenty-one and
twenty-five" members. Id.
31. In 1996, Manuel Tello, the representative from Mexico, proposed that there be no
increase in the number of permanent members on the U.N. Security Council. Id.
32. In 1996, Juli Minoves-Triquell, the representative from Andorra, expressed concern as
to the size of the U.N. Security Council as proposed by a series of other member states. He felt that

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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3
Cuba, 33 -Senegal,3' Egypt, 35 Ukraine, 36 Turkey, 3" Australia, ' Algeria,

and the Russian Federation.' We have chosen the reformation
proposals set out by these states because we believe that they reflect the
most comprehensive, practical solutions and suggestions yet proposed
to the U.N. General Assembly.
Our scrutiny of these proposals has led us to conclude that there
exists two main issues that a viable solution must address: the question
of how the composition of the U.N. Security Council can be made to
more effectively represent the U.N. General Assembly, and the question
of how veto power may be employed. Hence, we have created two
possible solutions: one is a short-term pragmatic solution that is suitable

the larger the U.N. Security Council, the more difficulty the U.N. Security Council would have in
its decision-rendering. Norway Press Release, supra note 22.
33. In 1996, Bruno Rodriquez, the representative from Cuba, proposed that broadening
membership in the U.N. Security Council, but opposed the existence of permanent seats in general.
Id
34. Debate Press Release, supranote 15. In 1998, IbraDeguene Ka, the representative.from
Senegal, proposed on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union,
that Africa be given two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats on the U.N. Security
Council that would be occupied on a rotating basis in order "to correct the existing imbalance." Id
35. In 1998, Nabil Elaraby, the Egyptian representative, introduced the draft'resolution on
the question of equitable representation on an increase in the membership of the U.N. Security
Council. He proposed that any country that wished to enter as a permanent or non-permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council or wished to reform the U.N. Security Council in any way
"should do so according to the Charter." Id.
36. In 1998, Volodymer Yel'Chenko, the representative from Ukraine, sought support for
Ukraine's election bid to become a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in order
to secure a seat for the Eastern European Group. Id.
37. In 1998, Tuluy Tanc, the representative from Turkey, suggested that any mere
enlargement of the U.N. Security Council would not solve the problematic situation regarding the
accurate representation of the U.N. General Assembly among the members of the U.N. Security
Council. Instead, he proposed that a "fair and workable system of rotation" be adopted. Id
38. In 1998, Penny Wensley, the representative from Australia, supported expansion of the
U.N. Security Council by proposing that under-represented developing regions, Germany, and
Japan be made permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Additionally, she proposed that
the number of non-permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council be increased to a figure that she
did not specify. Id.
39. In 1998, Abdallah Baali, the representative from Algeria, supported what remains the
African common position, and proposed that Africa be granted two permanent seats on the U.N.
Security Council, which would be rotated among all African states. Debate Press Release, supra
note 15.
40. In 1998, Sergey Lavrov, the representative from the Russian Federation, proposed that
the number of members in an enlarged U.N. Security Council "not exceed twenty or twenty-one."
This enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, he suggested, should include industrial as well as
developing nations, which should be treated equally in terms of status. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/4
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for immediate adoption, and the other is a long-term goal that we hope
the U.N. Security Council will someday achieve.
III. THE SOLUTION: SHORT-TERM FOR IMMEDIATE ADOPTION
By extrapolating from the proposals of the above named countries,
we have synthesized our own proposal that is mindful of the caveats
contemplated by representatives from Austria, Brazil, Malaysia, Poland,
Mexico, Andorra, and Cuba and emulates the suggested composition of
the U.N. Security Council, as proposed by representatives from
Norway, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Senegal, Egypt, Ukraine, Turkey,
Australia, Algeria, and the Russian Federation. We propose that the
U.N. Security Council consist of twenty members which would be
distributed as follows: The P-Five and their veto powers would remain
unchanged (United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, France).
Semi-permanent membership with veto powers would be granted to five
rotating seats with two-year terms from among a series of so-called
"middle powers."' These "middle powers" could include Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Ukraine. We
selected these countries according to the standard articulated by
Representative Celso Amorim of Brazil.42 We feel that each member of
this pool of "middle states" is "capable and willing to bear the
[responsibilities]" of semi-permanent membership and veto power
because of each state's political, social, and economic strength." The
non-permanent membership without veto power would remain
unchanged, with ten rotating seats for two-year terms from the
remainder of the U.N. General Assembly members."
According to this structure, the ethnic and cultural makeup of the
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council would be
representative of the world community, and smaller countries would
finally have the opportunity to participate in decision-making on a
global level. Additionally, by allowing states from the Middle-East and
the former Soviet republics (which are predominantly Muslim) to
41. See id.
42. See supra text accompanying note 28.
43. We acknowledge that the political, social, and economic strengths among these "middle
powers" do vary, but they are consistent because they are neither dominant world powers nor are
they third world powers.
44. See Timothy Penny &Mark Mullenbach, UN's Chosen Few - a Tricky Feat,CHIUSTUN
Sd. MONITOR, Sept. 24, 1997, at 19 (for a similar U.N. Security Council reform proposal).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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become semi-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the
U.N. Security Council would at last give a voice to cultures which have
historically been denied the opportunity to articulate their views in a
global arena.
Furthermore, we believe that this structure would foster a greater
sense of international cooperation among the members of the U.N.
Security Council. By employing our proposal, the balance of Security
Council veto power would be shifted away from a few member-states.
Power would instead be shared among a representative sample of many
states. Additionally, the P-Five's unfettered discretion would disappear
and as a result, diplomatic solutions would replace U.N. Security
Council actions that reflect idiosyncratic national interests.
IV. THE SOLUTION: THE LONG-TERM GOAL

While we stand by our proposal for a short-term solution to the U.N.
Security Council's ineffectual representative membership structure, we
would someday like to see the U.N. Security Council do away with veto
power and permanent member states altogether. Our hope for the future
of the U.N. Security Council mirrors proposals made to the U.N.
General Assembly by Juli Minoves Triquell, the representative of
Andora, who described the veto as "a relic of the Second World War"
that should be disposed of,45 and by Juan Ruiz, the representative of
Colombia, who has consistently asserted that the veto is an outdated
decision-making mechanism.46 We believe that by abolishing the U.N.
Security Council veto, the U.N. General Assembly can truly adhere to
the Preamble of the U.N. Charter, in which the U.N. General Assembly
"[reaffirms its] faith in ... the equal rights of... nations large and
small."47
Additionally, we concur with Bruno Rodriquez, the representative
from Cuba, who declared that permanent seats on the U.N. Security
Council are "discriminatory and selective, and would never, as long as
they existed, ensure the representation deserved and desired by the
developing world." 48 Again, we believe that the U.N. General Assembly
will continue to be consistently unable to abide by the Preamble of the
U.N. Charter until each member-state has an equal opportunity to assist

45. See supra text accompanying note 32.
46. See Frustration Press Release, supra note 11.

47. U.N.

CHARTER

pmbl.

48. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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all other member-states to make global decisions, perhaps by a plurality
of all votes taken among the U.N. General Assembly.
Mr. Secretary-General, if both the short-term and long-term structures that we have submitted as templates for the reformation of the
U.N. Security Council are infeasible, at this time then we ask that the
Working Group continue its diligent U.N. General Assembly-supported
search for a satisfactory U.N. Security Council reformation scheme. We
have faith that the Working Group will one day create a U.N. Security
Council membership structure that will achieve the genuine
international cooperation which the world of the Twenty-First Century
requires in order to confront contemporary and potential violent
conflicts. We write to you because these violent conflicts have caused,
and will continue to cause, the suffering of countless civilians, from
refugees and internally displaced people to the millions around the
world that are afflicted by widespread poverty, hunger, illness, and lack
of education.
We believe that reforming the U.N. Security Council is the essential
sine qua non of the global community's achievement of the many goals
set by the United Nations at summit conferences, in U.N. declarations,
in practice, and in conventions. Without such reform, we fear that
genuine global peace and justice will long be consigned to the sphere of
rhetoric instead of action. Zamira Eshmambetova, the representative
from Kyrgyzstan, fittingly identified our collective position regarding
U.N. Security Council reform by stating that the Working Group's lack
of progress was the direct result of the fact that there have been "too
many discussions and not enough negotiations," and that "the time has
come for genuine negotiations, compromise, and action.' ' 9 Sir, we
believe that as Secretary-General of the United Nations, and as a citizen
of the world, you are equal to the task at hand. We ask you to actively
guide the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a workable solution to
reform the U.N. Security Council.
Sincerely,
Craig Hammer

49. See Debate Press Release, supra note 15.
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